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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-3423 
___________ 
 
OLUSEGUN BEXLEY AYODELE, 
Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A020-067-957) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Jesus Clemente; previously Honorable Andrew 
Arthur  
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 12, 2012 
 
Before: JORDAN, HARDIMAN and ROTH, Circuit 
 
Judges 
(Opinion filed:  March 30, 2012) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
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 Olusegun Bexley Ayodele, a citizen of Nigeria, entered the United States in 
1972.  His status was adjusted to that of a lawful permanent resident in 1975.  In 
1993, Ayodele was convicted in federal court of importing heroin in violation of 
21 U.S.C. § 952(a) and was sentenced to 37 months of imprisonment and five 
years of supervised release.  In 1995, he was placed in exclusion proceedings, but 
an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) granted him a waiver of exclusion (under the now-
repealed Section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act) in early 1996.   
 In 1998, Ayodele was convicted in New Jersey Superior Court for 
aggravated assault in the third degree, resisting arrest, possession of heroin, and 
manufacturing, distributing, or dispensing heroin.  Also in 1998, Ayodele pleaded 
guilty to possessing heroin with the intent to distribute it, for which he was 
sentenced to one year and one day in prison.  In 2009, in light of the 1998 guilty 
plea for possession, he was adjudicated guilty of violating the terms of his 
supervised release on his earlier federal conviction.  
 The Government charged Ayodele as removable in April 2010 for having 
been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude not arising out of a single 
scheme of criminal misconduct, for having been convicted of an offense relating to 
illicit trafficking in a controlled substance, and for having been convicted of a 
violation of or a conspiracy or attempt to violate a law relating to a controlled 
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substance.  Ayodele conceded all the allegations in the notice to appear except the 
allegation that he had been convicted of manufacturing, distributing, or dispensing 
a dangerous controlled substance.  The first IJ who reviewed the matter sustained 
the allegation based on the criminal conviction evidence the Government 
submitted; the second IJ agreed based on the same evidence and Ayodele’s 
testimony at his hearing.  The IJ ruled that Ayodele was removable as charged.   
 Ayodele applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the 
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  Concluding that Ayodele’s federal 
conviction for importing heroin was illicit trafficking of a controlled substance and 
an aggravated felony, the IJ held that he was not eligible for asylum.  The IJ 
applied the same analysis to Ayodele’s conviction for manufacturing with the 
intent to deliver heroin.  The IJ also held that Ayodele was not eligible for statutory 
withholding of removal because he had been convicted of a particularly serious 
crime.  The IJ concluded that even though Ayodele had been sentenced to fewer 
than 5 years in prison, the fact that he pleaded guilty voluntarily, and that he 
thought he was smuggling gold, rather than heroin, into the  country did not 
overcome the presumption that his illicit trafficking offense was a particularly 
serious crime.  Having determined that Ayodele had committed a particularly 
serious crime, the IJ held that he was subject to mandatory denial of withholding of 
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removal under the CAT.  The IJ additionally ruled that Ayodele did not meet his 
burden to show that he was entitled to deferral of removal under the CAT.   
 Ayodele appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).  The BIA 
stated that it was undisputed that his criminal convictions rendered him removable 
as charged and ineligible for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT 
withholding.  The BIA rejected Ayodele’s claim that the IJ erred in denying the 
application for deferral of removal.  The BIA also denied various asserted due 
process claims and noted the irrelevancy of Ayodele’s contentions relating to 
collateral review of his criminal convictions that he apparently was seeking.      
Ayodele presents a petition for review.  As a preliminary matter, we must 
consider the scope of our review.  Our jurisdiction is circumscribed because 
Ayodele is removable for having been convicted of an aggravated felony.  See 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C).  However, we retain jurisdiction over constitutional claims 
and questions of law. See Pierre v. Att’y Gen., 528 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(en banc) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)-(D)); see also Silva-Rengifo v. Att’y 
Gen., 473 F.3d 58, 63 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Kamara v. Att’y Gen., 420 F.3d 202, 
210-11 (3d Cir. 2005), for the proposition that the “jurisdictional grant regarding 
appeals by aggravated felons extends not just to legal determinations but also to 
application of law to facts”).  We do not consider, however, issues that were not 
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exhausted in the agency proceedings.1  See Bonhometre v. Gonzales
Because our jurisdiction is limited, we cannot consider Ayodele’s challenge 
to the denial of CAT relief to the extent Ayodele takes issue with factual 
determinations by the agency.  However, Ayodele also argues that the agency used 
the wrong standard in assessing his CAT claim.  In order to succeed on a CAT 
claim a petitioner must show “‘that it is more likely than not that he or she would 
be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.’”  
, 414 F.3d 
442, 447 (3d Cir. 2005) (footnotes omitted); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1).   
Sevoian v. Ashcroft
                                              
1 Accordingly, we do not consider Ayodele’s challenge to his removability or the other 
issues he did not raise before the BIA.   
, 
290 F.3d 166, 174-75 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2)).  Further, a 
petitioner must show that the torturous acts would be inflicted “by or at the 
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other 
person acting in an official capacity.”  8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1).  In ruling on the 
CAT claim, the IJ stated this standard.  IJ Decision at 11.  Similarly, the BIA’s 
ruling ostensibly is an application of this standard.  BIA Decision at 2 (stating that 
Ayodele did not show that it was more likely than not that he would be tortured 
and alternatively concluding that even if he had, he had not shown the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official to any torture).   
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 To meet the CAT standard, an alien must offer sufficient objective evidence.  
See Sevoian, 290 F.3d at 175.  Essentially, the agency ruled that Ayodele’s 
evidence was insufficient to meet the standard.  The IJ noted that Ayodele failed to 
show that the two persons he named as a threat were public officials in Nigeria or 
would act to harm him, with or without the acquiescence of public officials.  The IJ 
stated that Ayodele had not even shown that the two persons he feared were in 
Nigeria, stating that Ayodele had testified only that he believed they were in 
Nigeria and admitted that he had not seen them since 1996, 1997, or 1998.  
Although he claimed they had family members in the Nigerian government around 
that time period, he conceded that he did not know if they remained in the 
government and did not show that they would consent or acquiesce to acts of 
torture even if they were public officials.  The agency also considered that any 
corruption in the Nigerian government was neither so widespread as to be 
presumed to occur in the majority of cases nor present in the form of acquiescence 
to torture.  These determinations relating to what Ayodele could face in Nigeria are 
factual findings, see Kaplun v. Att’y Gen., 602 F.3d 260, 271 (3d Cir. 2010), and 
accordingly cannot be reconsidered in this case, see supra.  Taking the facts as 
found by the agency, there is no error in the application of the CAT standard.  On 
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those facts, it does not seem more likely than not that Ayodele will be tortured in 
Nigeria.   
 Furthermore, to the extent that Ayodele’s challenge to the denial of CAT 
relief included, and continues to include, a due process claim based on the state-
created danger exception to the general rule that the Due Process Clause imposes 
no obligation on the state to protect an individual from harm inflicted by private 
parties, see, e.g., Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1208 (3d Cir. 1996), the claim is 
without merit.  We have “stated unequivocally that ‘the state-created danger 
exception has no place in our immigration jurisprudence.’”  Rranci v. Att’y Gen., 
540 F.3d 165, 171 (3d Cir. 2008); see also Kamara
Ayodele also contends that the IJ violated various constitutional rights (and 
abused his discretion) in denying him a continuance.  Considering the matter, 
, 420 F.3d at 217.   
see 
Hoxha v. Holder, 559 F.3d 157, 163 n.5 (3d Cir. 2009), we conclude that the IJ did 
not err.  Ayodele sought a continuance because he wanted to seek documents 
related to his conviction.  R. 399.  (He contended that some documents related to 
his original conviction that were used in charging him with a violation of his terms 
of supervised release were inaccurate and the Government was also presenting 
“some indictment and some information” to the IJ that were not true.  R. 399.)  
However, Ayodele admitted the underlying conviction.  R. 399 & 400.  Although 
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Ayodele asserted that he was trying to have it overturned, R. 400, it was final for 
immigration purposes.  See Paredes v. Att’y Gen., 528 F.3d 196, 198-99 (3d Cir. 
2008) (holding that the pendency of collateral attacks does not negate the finality 
of convictions for immigration removal purposes).2
 Related to the denial of the continuance, Ayodele also complains about the 
IJ’s “sarcastic remarks [and] hostility.”   IJs must remain neutral and impartial in 
conducting immigration hearings and “‘assiduously refrain from becoming 
advocates for either party.’” 
    
Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 596 (3d Cir. 
2003) (citation omitted); see also Wang v. Att’y Gen.
 For these reasons, we deny the petition for review.    
, 423 F.3d 260, 268 (3d Cir. 
2005).  Contrary to Ayodele’s assertion, the IJ met those obligations.   
 
 
                                              
2 For this reason, Ayodele’s various challenges to his underlying convictions that he 
raises in his brief do not change the result.   
